sandbox_..._selinux(8)

💅 sandbox_..._selinux(8) — the SELinux Policy sandbox_min_client page, bestie edition 🎀

okay so this is the manual page for sandbox_..._selinux(8), and it's literally all about the SELinux policy for the sandbox_min_client processes. grab a snack, we're getting into it ✨

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🌸 NAME 🌸

sandbox_min_client_selinux — Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sandbox_min_client processes 🫶

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✨ DESCRIPTION ✨

Security-Enhanced Linux secures the sandbox_min_client processes via flexible mandatory access control. that's the whole vibe. 💅

The sandbox_min_client processes execute with the sandbox_min_client_t SELinux type. wanna check if you've got these processes running? just run the ps command with the -Z qualifier, easy.

for example:

ps -eZ | grep sandbox_min_client_t

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👑 PROCESS TYPES 👑

so SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system. yes, every single one. main character energy for all of them, honestly.

you can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps.

policy governs the access confined processes have to files. the SELinux sandbox_min_client policy is super flexible, allowing users to setup their sandbox_min_client processes in as secure a method as possible. obsessed. 🔥

the following process types are defined for sandbox_min_client:

sandbox_min_client_t

Note: semanage permissive -a sandbox_min_client_t can be used to make the process type sandbox_min_client_t permissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. so like, it's not a free pass — the receipts still show up 😭

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🦋 BOOLEANS 🦋

SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. the sandbox_min_client policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sandbox_min_client with the tightest access possible. tightest access possible = the goal, fr fr.

if you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable, this is dangerous and the executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the deny_execmem boolean. Disabled by default. ngl, please read that warning twice 💀

setsebool -P deny_execmem 1

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🎀 MANAGED FILES 🎀

the SELinux process type sandbox_min_client_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. the paths listed are the default paths for these file types. note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions — SELinux isn't out here doing DAC's homework, iykyk.

• fusefs_t
  • /run/user/[0-9]+/gvfs
• mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t
• sandbox_file_t
• sandbox_min_client_tmpfs_t
• security_t
  • /selinux

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🌈 COMMANDS 🌈

• semanage fcontext can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
• semanage permissive can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
• semanage module can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
• semanage boolean can also be used to manipulate the booleans.
• system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. yes bestie, a whole GUI, iconic 🖥️✨

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🧚 AUTHOR 🧚

This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage. not me being auto-generated and still serving looks 💅

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💜 SEE ALSO 💜

selinux(8), sandbox_min_client(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)

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okay that's the whole page, you ate that 🍓 and just so you have the receipts: this was sandbox_min_client — dated 26-10-06 — from the sandbox_..._selinux(8) manual. slay, go forth and confine your processes responsibly 💖🦋